Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin - Institut für Philosophie

Abstract:

In classical epistemological debates around contextualism, a distinction between attributor- and subject-contextualism is being made. Esa Díaz-León (2016) uses this distinction for her discussion of Jennifer Saul’s (2012) contextualist proposal (CP) of a definition of 'woman'. Since as such this proposal does not do justice to trans women’s self-identity claims, she proposes (CP) to be understood as referring to subject-contextualism.

In my talk, I argue against Díaz-León’s defence of Saul’s approach. I argue that Díaz-León presupposes that most people are cis, i.e. non-trans, wherefore the account fails in other possible worlds or even in smaller areas of this actual world such as trans communities. To do so, I begin by summarising Saul’s account as well as Díaz-León’s response to it. Afterwards, I present my counterargument against this response and bring forward two desiderata that an account of the meaning of 'woman' needs to meet: First, an account of 'woman' should not define trans women via cis women and second, such an account should not presuppose that most people are cis. In the end, I discuss a possible objection against my argument.

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