Appendix to Iα5: Aubenque's arguments against K

    I will respond briefly to Aubenque's arguments for the inauthenticity and confusion of <u>Metaphysics</u> K, other than the main arguments which I have already discussed in the body of Iα5. I will not generally give page references to Aubenque's article (cited in the body of Iα5), but will simply cite as headers the same passages of K which he also cites as headers for his paragraphs. Sometimes my line-ranges differ slightly from his.

    K1 1059a18 ἡ σοφία περὶ ἀρχὰς ἐπιστήμη τίς ἐστι. Aubenque objects that the object of a science in Aristotle is expressed by a genitive, not by περὶ with accusative. See A1 982a2, ἡ σοφία περί τινας ἀρχὰς καὶ αἰτίας ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη.
    K1 1059a19-23, the parallel to B#1. Aubenque complains that K picks up only the first objection in B#1, asking whether wisdom can be a single science of several ἀρχαί or causes if these aren't contrary, rather than the second objection, that mathematical and other unmoved things don't have efficient or final causes. This is true, but is no complaint against K, particularly since K picks up the second objection later, 1059a34-8. Aubenque says that the latter passage, in arguing that the desired science isn't about the final cause, doesn't agree with Aristotle's considered opinion, and this is true, but the argument is part of an aporia, and Aristotle does think the conclusion would follow given the plausible Academic assumption that wisdom seeks causes of unmoved things. (Aubenque apparently thinks, wrongly, that Aristotle thinks unmoved things do have final causes; he cites B#1 996b12-13, which give no support at all.) Curiously, Aubenque misses the real difficulty in 1059a34-8, the apparent equivocation in "ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις" between saying that unmoved things can't <u>have</u> efficient or final causes or that they can't <u>be</u> efficient or final causes. But, again, the argument is merely provisional, and may be assuming with Speusippus (apparently the source of the argument) that a cause and its effect must belong to the same genus of beings, or with the provisional argument of EE I,8 1218b5-6 that τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις ἀγαθόν is not acquired by action [πρακτόν], and therefore cannot be a good-for-the-sake-of-which (cf. 1217a30-40). See discussion in Iβ2c.
    K1 1059a23-6, the parallel to B#2. Aubenque says that the question here, "Does it belong to one or several sciences to study the principles of demonstration? If one, why this rather than any other? If several, which?", makes no sense, and that the real question is whether the science of the principles of demonstration and the science of the principles of substance are the same. But the question here is paralleled at B#2 996b26-7 (Aubenque gives a strained interpretation of this sentence in order to suggest that K is parroting B without understanding), and 996b33-997a2 help to show the concern. Does each science examine its own principles of demonstration? It seems not, since they seem to use the same principles, and since each science seems to presuppose them. But then does just one science, the science of some one genus, consider the principles presupposed in common by all sciences? Since each science seems to be related in the same way to the principles they all presuppose, why should it belong to one science more than another to study them? A similar argument is developed by Eudemus Fr. 34, although without specific reference to principles of <u>demonstration</u>.
    K1 1059a36, the good-for-the-sake-of-which ἐν τοῖς πρακτοῖς ὑπάρχει. Aubenque's objection turns on assuming that this means that only practicable things <u>have</u> this kind of cause (see B#1 996b5-6, which he cites as parallel), but it means rather that only practicable things can <u>be</u> good-as-for-the-sake-of-which, see EE I,8 1217a30-40 and 1218b5-6, where the good-as-for-

the-sake-of-which is πρακτόν. (At 1060a13, where Aubenque objects to ὑπάρχειν with dative in the sense of "to be immanent in," it means "to be predicated of," and is Aristotle's standard usage. At 1060a10, where he objects to a quasi-copula use of ὑπάρχειν, see the examples in Bonitz' Index s.v., notably Meteorology II,8 365b24 ὑπάρχει ἡ γῆ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ξηρά.)

K1 1059a35 τὴν ἐπιζητουμένην ἐπιστήμην. It is true, as Aubenque says, that K1-2 speaks of the ζητουμένη or ἐπιζητουμένη ἐπιστήμη more often (7 times) than the B parallel (3 times); this is no objection against K.

K1 1059b3, in the parallel to B#5, εἴδη ὅτι οὐκ ἔστι, δῆλον. Aubenque says he doesn't know any passage where Aristotle so brutally takes leave of the Ideas. The brutality results from the concision of K, but is not hard to parallel, e.g. the notoriously brutal Posterior Analytics I,22 83a32-4. (In his footnote Aubenque rejects the parallel Z14 1039b18-19, not on the legitimate ground that this passage is the conclusion of an argument while K1 1059b3 is bare assertion [which results from the concision of K], but on the worthless ground that Z14 says that there are no εἴδη οὕτως ὥς τινές φασιν. Both Z14 and K1 equally clearly mean separately existing forms.) Aubenque says, bizarrely, that when B#5 997b3-5 says "we have said [sc. in A9] in what way the forms are both causes and οὐσίαι καθ᾽ ἑαυτάς", Aristotle is endorsing this claim about the forms.

K1 1059b3-9, in the parallel to B#5, Aubenque objects to the use of a "third man" argument as an aporia against positing intermediate mathematicals, concluding that there is a third man intermediate between the Form and the sensible individuals. (The argument is in the parallel B#5 997b12-24, with "animal" rather than "man," and without "third.") Aubenque wrongly assumes that there was only one third man argument, when we know that there was a whole family of them; see Iβ4c. The passage shows that the author of K understood the function of such sophisms better than Aubenque, and than most modern scholars.

K1 1059b15-16 to what science does it belong διαπορῆσαι περὶ τῆς τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕλης? Aubenque finds a difficulty in the phrase "ἡ τῶν μαθηματικῶν ὕλη", which does not occur verbatim elsewhere in the corpus; but wherever Aristotle talks about mathematicals (whether separately existing or not) he assumes that they have a matter, and Bonitz and Ross (cited by Aubenque) are right in saying that this is what Aristotle calls νοητὴ ὕλη at Z10 1036a9-12 and Z11 1036b32-1037a5. Aubenque rejects this and points to Academic doctrines of ἀρχαί, but this is not a separate topic: everyone who posited mathematicals thought they had some material substratum, although they may disagree about what the substratum is and what ontological status it (or the mathematicals themselves) may have. K quite reasonably says that it will belong to wisdom to investigate these questions. (Aubenque asks why this should not belong to mathematics itself; because no science investigates its own principles, or the existence or essence of its own genus.) Aubenque is right to say that Metaphysics N considers and rejects the thesis that eternal things have matter, but wrong to say that N regards this thesis as so evidently absurd that the concept of a matter of eternal things should not be raised even in an aporetic context; indeed, parts of M and N can be seen as fulfilling the program that K sets out here. In any case the Z10-11 passages (and M3) show that Aristotle himself believes in a non-separate intelligible matter of non-separate mathematicals. Aubenque suggests that K here is drawing on N, but the idea that mathematicals have matter was standard among Academics including Aristotle, and there is no need to posit dependence on any one particular text, still less that K is misunderstanding or misusing that text. Aubenque speaks of "le paradoxe qui fait ici que la 'matière' des êtres mathématiques est plus digne d'être étudiée par la sagesse, donc plus immatérielle, que ne le sont les êtres mathématiques eux-mêmes," but K does not say that

something must be immaterial to be an object of wisdom; the claim is not that the matter of mathematicals is more immaterial than the mathematicals, but that it is more of an ἀρχή than they are. Putting "matter" here in scarequotes reflects the modern assumption that only sensible or changeable things have matter, but Aristotle's contemporaries did not share that assumption. Aristotle (or the author of K, whoever that was) would not have seen the notion of a matter of mathematical things as paradoxical, and therefore would not feel the need to explain the paradox, as Aubenque demands.

K1 1059b21-4, in the parallel to B#6. The issue is framed slightly differently from B#6: where B#6 asks whether the στοιχεῖα καὶ ἀρχαί are the genera or the material constituents of things, K asks whether the desired science is about "the ἀρχαί which some call στοιχεῖα--they all posit these as constituents of composites," or about the universals and genera. Aubenque says that the "some" who call the constituents στοιχεῖα are the Platonists, but they are certainly the physicists, who in B#6 are said to make these constituents, rather than the genera, στοιχεῖα. (Aubenque's thought is that the one and the indefinite dyad would be the kind of στοιχεῖα that the author is opposing to the genera, but B#6 998b9-11 says that the one and the indefinite dyad are genera. Apparently for Aubenque K would never consider <u>physical</u> στοιχεῖα at all, perhaps because he thinks K takes it as definitional that wisdom is about immaterial things.) Aubenque says that K presents 1059b23-4, "they all posit these as constituents of composites," as an argument that the στοιχεῖα cannot be the ἀρχαί, because they are parts of composites and the desired science is not about composites. This would indeed be a silly argument, but the text contains nothing of the kind. The clause is simply an explanation of what kind of στοιχεῖα are meant, not an argument that they are not the desired ἀρχαί: the argument that these are not the desired ἀρχαί comes in 1059b24-7, arguing that the universals and genera (rather than the constituents) are the objects of science and definition, and then 1059b24-1060a1 give the other side, arguing on behalf of the constituents by raising dilemmas for the thesis that the ἀρχαί are the genera. (Aubenque, relying on his assumption that the στοιχεῖα under attack here are the one and the indefinite dyad, thinks that the author of K wrongly believes that these στοιχεῖα are constituents and attacks them on that ground, and he tries to explain how the author would come to this misapprehension by positing that he has uncritically read and accepted N2 1088b15-16, σύνθετον πᾶν τὸ ἐκ στοιχείων, where Aristotle "affecte de croire que les Platoniciens ont pu tenir les êtres éternels pour composés." But--even if this passage had anything to do with K1 1059b21-4--the Platonists, and anyone else who thought numbers were eternal, did indeed believe that eternal beings could be composite. While Aubenque is right that the argument he reads into 1059b23-4, that the στοιχεῖα cannot be the ἀρχαί because they are parts of composites and the desired science is not about composites, would be a silly argument, he thinks it would be silly because the Platonic στοιχεῖα are <u>not</u> parts of composites; in fact the reason it would be silly is that K does not assume, and has no right to assume, that wisdom is not seeking ἀρχαί of composites.)

K1 1059b38-1060a1, in the parallel to B#7, ᾗ δὲ συναναιρεῖται τοῖς γένεσι τὰ εἴδη, τὰ γένη ταῖς ἀρχαῖς ἔοικε μᾶλλον· ἀρχὴ γὰρ τὸ συναναιροῦν, with no close parallel in B. Aubenque correctly points out that this test for priority has Aristotelian parallels and Academic roots, and that the K parallel can't have arisen simply by a mechanical summary of B#7. But his conclusion is strange: "j'en conclurai pour ma part ou que l'auteur de K connaissait le texte de Topiques VI 4, ou, plus probablement, qu'il avait sous les yeux, en même temps que B, un autre catalogue aristotélicien d'apories, probablement antérieur à celui du livre B, et où Aristote utilisait encore la méthode académique de la συναναίρεσις pour poser le problème de la relation de priorité entre

genre et espèce." But there is no reason to think Aristotle ever gave up συναναίρεσις, i.e. what I have called "Plato's test," as a test for priority (although there is also no reason to think that K regards this test as decisive): Aristotle describes the method, although without the verb συναναιρεῖν, notably at <u>Metaphysics</u> Δ11 1019a1-4 and <u>Categories</u> c12 14a29-35, applying it to prove the priority of genera to species at <u>Categories</u> c13 15a4-7, and he uses συναναιρεῖν in the relevant sense (although not explicitly as a test of priority) in <u>Categories</u> c7 7b15-8a12. It is true that the <u>Metaphysics</u> does not use "συναναιρεῖν" outside the present passage (besides the two occurrences cited, it is also used a few lines above, 1059b30-31), although as Aubenque notes Λ5 1071a35 ἀναιρεῖται ἀναιρουμένων is close, but this is merely a terminological variation. There is no reason to posit any literary connection with <u>Topics</u> VI,4, and in positing that the author of K is using "un autre catalogue aristotélicien d'apories, probablement antérieur à celui du livre B" Aubenque is conceding all that Jaeger wants. But the method of composition that Aubenque suggests for K, combining the basic text of BΓE with supplementary Aristotelian sources (conceived as written documents), is implausible.

K2 1060a5-7, in the parallel to B#8, εἴρηται why the desired science cannot be about genera or species (existing apart from the individuals). Aubenque asks where this has been said. It was said at K1 1059b24-1060a1, arguing in close parallel to B#7 against the "Platonist" answer to B#6, i.e. that (as B puts it) the ἀρχαί and στοιχεῖα of things are their genera, or (as K puts it) that the desired science is about universals or genera. K1 1059b24-1060a1, like B#7, asks whether the higher or the lower universals are prior (as maintained by Plato and Xenocrates respectively) and argues against each horn. K2 1060a5-7 is closely paralleled at B#8 999a29-32, where the back-reference is to B#7.

K2 1060a10-11, in the parallel to B#8, ζητεῖν ἐοίκαμεν ἄλλην τινὰ [sc. οὐσίαν παρὰ τὰς αἰσθητάς]: Aubenque says that in this context "Aristote emploie presque toujours ἑτέρα, qui marque plus fortement l'hétérogénéité." See B#5 997a34-5 πότερον τὰς αἰσθητὰς οὐσίας μόνας εἶναι φατέον ἢ καὶ παρὰ ταύτας ἄλλας, the parallel B1 995b14-15, and B#13 1002b12-14, Z2 1028b13-15, and Λ10 1075b24-5.

K2 1060a22-3, in the parallel to B#8, τοῦτο δὲ [sc. τὸ εἶδος καὶ ἡ μορφή] φθαρτόν. Aubenque says it is un-Aristotelian to say that the form is corruptible. This is wrong: as Aubenque admits in a footnote, <u>Physics</u> I,9 192a34-b1, delimiting the domains of physics and first philosophy, says that physics will speak περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ φθαρτῶν εἰδῶν. Aubenque tries to suggest that this phrase is "une brachylogie pour 'les formes des êtres physiques et corruptibles,'" but the forms of natural and corruptible things might, for all we know in <u>Physics</u> I, be separate eternal Platonic forms, and the point here is to set those aside to examine only forms that are themselves natural and corruptible. As the same footnote also admits, <u>Metaphysics</u> H3 1043b14-16 says that the form of a composite is <u>either</u> eternal <u>or</u> corruptible without process of corruption; Aubenque says that Aristotle chooses the first of these options, eternity, but this is ruled out by the parallel Z15 1039b20-27 and by Λ3 1070a21-4.

K2 1060a3-27, the parallel to B#8, more generally (treated by Aubenque still in the paragraph headed "1060a22-3"). Many of the same points are made here and in B#8, but the argument is structured rather differently. Aubenque tries to show at some length (pp.336-8) that K's version of the argument is incoherent, but it makes good sense. In both B#8 and K2 1060a3-27, the basic aporia is: we are looking for eternal οὐσίαι, which must be distinct from all individual sensible οὐσίαι (B#8 999b4-5 says that all sensibles are corruptible, as does K1 1059b14 [in the parallel to B#5], although on Aristotle's own view the heavenly bodies are not), but the most plausible candidates for eternal οὐσίαι, especially Platonic forms, do not withstand scrutiny. Why exactly

are we looking for such eternal οὐσίαι? Both B and K argue that scientific knowledge would be impossible without them, and B also argues that coming-to-be, and K that cosmic order [τάξις, 1060a26-7], would be impossible without something eternal. B also uses the analyses of knowledge and coming-to-be to argue specifically that the forms of sensible individuals must be eternal οὐσίαι παρά the sensibles, where K does not; both B and K give similar arguments against such forms (B adds a further argument, 999b20-24). (They both say that the matter of sensible things is not sufficient as the eternal οὐσία we are seeking; here, exceptionally, K supplies more of an argument, 1060a20-21.) On either formulation, the aporia will be solved in part by showing that Aristotle's theory of inseparate forms is able to account for knowledge (and, on the B version, for coming-to-be), and in part by showing that there is a separate eternally unchanging οὐσία which is not a Platonic form and not liable to the objections against such forms: thus Λ10 says "if there are not other things παρά the sensibles, there will not be an ἀρχή and order [τάξις] and coming-to-be and the heavenly [bodies]" (1075b24-6) and then goes on to argue that Aristotle's νοῦς meets the demand better than Platonic forms or numbers or any pair of contraries. Aubenque tries to show that while B seeks something separate and eternal to account for coming-to-be and for the intelligibility of the sensible world, K has no interest in accounting for the intelligibility of sensible things (sic--despite K's argument from cosmic τάξις, 1029a26-7), but rather "substitue la préoccupation assez futile de garantir à la sagesse un objet qui ne soit pas indigne d'elle." It is true that K argues that wisdom is not about these sensible things and must therefore be about something else, but this is because wisdom is about the ἀρχαί, and if the sensibles are generable and corruptible or otherwise dependent on something else (e.g. for their ordering) then they cannot be the ἀρχαί. Aristotle consistently maintains this argument, and there is nothing absurd or futile about it. (Compare B#5 and #6, which ask whether certain things are οὐσίαι, or whether they are ἀρχαί, when the K parallel asks whether these things are the objects of wisdom, which is equivalent to their being ἀρχαί and presupposes their being οὐσίαι.) Aubenque says that K, having abandoned the Ideas, sees theology as "le seul garant de l'existence d'un 'être éternel, séparé, et permanent,'" like Jaeger's second-stage Aristotle, and like, in fact, the real Aristotle from the beginning to the end of his career; Aubenque thinks the genuinely Aristotelian alternative which the author of K missed is that the forms of corruptible things are themselves eternal and are the objects of wisdom, but Aubenque is wrong and K right about what Aristotle thought. (Aubenque says that K's only argument for concluding that "there is an eternal οὐσία, separate and καθ᾽ αὑτήν" [1060a23-4, negated]--which he takes to mean separate from bodies--is 1060a24-7, "un argument d'autorité et … une vague allusion au livre Λ." The τάξις argument--whose "γάρ" at a26 explains the reasoning of the "authorities," the χαριέστατοι of a25--is indeed parallel to Λ10 1075b24-6, but it is not alluding to the Λ10 passage, which is marking Aristotle's solution to the aporia raised in varying forms here and in B#8. Nor is it the only argument: even if K2 1060a3-27 do not make explicit the argument that corruptible things cannot be ἀρχαί, and presuppose prior ἀρχαί, it is made explicit a few lines later, a34-6.)

   K3 1061a10-11 παντὸς τοῦ ὄντος πρὸς ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν ἡ ἀναγωγή, in Aubenque's translation "la réduction de l'étant en sa totalité à quelque chose d'un et de commun" (probably "de chaque étant" would be more accurate); K3 1061b11-12 τὸ ὂν ἅπαν καθ᾽ ἕν τι καὶ κοινὸν λέγεται πολλαχῶς λεγόμενον (Aubenque pp.339-40). Aubenque sees here the origins of two interpretive tendencies that he had attacked in Le problème de l'être as un-Aristotelian, namely a tendency to understand being as univocal (even while paying lip-service to its being said πρὸς ἕν) and an attempt to "reduce" the derivative senses of being to the primary sense. Aubenque

complains that the phrase cited from 1061b11-12 contains a contradiction in terms, since K3 1060b32-3 had contrasted being said πολλαχῶς with being said καθ᾽ ἕνα τρόπον. But Γ2 1003b12-15 says that things that are said πρὸς μίαν φύσιν are "somehow" [τρόπον τινὰ] καθ᾽ ἕν; K omits the qualification through concision, but obviously K too is aware that some qualification is needed. Further, while 1060b32-3 denies that being is said καθ᾽ ἕνα τρόπον, the one common thing that being is said κατά at 1061b11-2 is not a τρόπος, a common sense of being or a common way in which being is said, but rather substance: everything that is called a being is so called through some relation to this one common thing, different relations to this one common thing yielding different senses of being. (Being said κατά τι κοινόν is a necessary and sufficient condition for falling under a single science already at 1060b33-6; then K launches into the examples of "healthy" and "medical," which must be intended to illustrate being said κατά τι κοινόν, but obviously not univocity. If the author committed the self-contradiction which Aubenque ascribes to him, he would have committed it between the two halves of the first sentence of K3, 1060b30-36.) Aubenque says that Aristotle never speaks of ἀναγωγή, in the context in which it is used in K3 1061a1-3, a10-11, and a11-15. This is wrong at least as regards the third passage, on the ἀναγωγή of all contrarieties to unity and plurality or the like, which is closely paralleled at Γ2 1004b33-1005a1 (as Aubenque quasi-admits in his footnote); and there is no reason why it should be any more objectionable to ἀνάγειν a derivative sense of being to the primary sense. Aubenque is apparently objecting to the implication that the ἀναγωγή would be reversible, so that all of the senses of being could be "deduced" in a single scheme, but "ἀνάγειν" has no such implication: to say that qualities are called beings because they are qualities of primary beings is already an ἀναγωγή, and no more is promised or desired. Γ2 1003b5-6 says that τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς μὲν ἀλλ᾽ ἅπαν πρὸς μίαν ἀρχήν, and this is what K3 means too. Aubenque contrasts the single ἀρχή (namely substance) of Γ2 with the common thing of K3, but this common thing is a common ἀρχή rather than a common predicate, as is confirmed by the language of ἀναγωγή. In any discipline where there are ἀρχαί the task is to ἀνάγειν the other objects of the discipline to [εἰς] these ἀρχαί as their causes, and ἀναγωγή is always to an ἀρχή or a cause, not to a universal under which the object falls: so in physics, e.g. Physics II,3 194b17-23 and several uses in Physics II,7, and likewise for syllogistic "reduction" in the Prior Analytics.