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How the *Ceteris Paribus* Laws of Physics Lie

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After a brief survey of the literature on *ceteris paribus* clauses and *ceteris paribus* laws (1), the problem of exceptions, which creates the need for cp laws, is discussed (2). It emerges that the so-called skeptical view of laws of nature does not apply to laws of any kind whatever. Only *some* laws of physics are plagued with exceptions, not *the* laws (3). Cp clauses promise a remedy, which has to be located among the further reactions to the skeptical view (4). After inspecting various translations of the Latin term “*ceteris paribus*” (5), the paper arrives at the conclusion that, on the most reasonable translation, there are no such things as cp laws, for reasons of logical form. Cp clauses have an indexical content, so that they need singular propositions as their habitat, not general ones. Cp clauses and the universal generalizations they are supposed to modify are not fit for each other (6).