

It is a point now well recognized that Kant's conception of cognition may be fundamentally different from our contemporary conception of knowledge. The point goes beyond observing a potential anachronism. One of Kant's primary concerns in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is an account of a priori cognition in metaphysics. If this is not a theory of a priori knowledge as we understand it today, then what is it? I will defend, by novel means, a novel answer to this question. Kant's account of a priori cognition in metaphysics is an account of what we must already count as knowing *tacitly* if we are to have a world in view at all. It is then one of the central tasks of transcendental philosophy to make such tacit knowledge explicit. This constitutes a move from *Erkenntnis* to *Wissen*, from mere cognition to scientific knowledge proper.

First I appeal to contemporary work on semantic anti-realism to argue on philosophical grounds that Kant is committed to the thesis that all synthetic a priori truths in scientific theoretical metaphysics are always known by everyone. Then, instead of taking this result to be a reductio of Kant's position, I consider how he might embrace it. The thesis is not absurd, nor is it too idealist for Kant, if such truths derive from the essential structure of human experience and if the knowledge in question is of a special kind already implicated in the mere partaking of such experience. So understood, the thesis provides an interesting perspective on transcendental idealism and Kant's Critical project more generally, it coheres with a number of Kant's core doctrines, including those in his practical philosophy, and it contains important lessons for how we are to understand Kant's relation to Leibniz on the topic of innatism.