IIIγ3: Λ10: the promise about the good redeemed and the aporiai about the ἀρχαί resolved

Moving from Λ9 to Λ10 means moving from questions about νοῦς to questions about the good. Λ9's conclusions about νοῦς also have implications about the good as the object of νοῦς--namely, that that good is νοῦς, and νοῦς of the special kind described in Λ9. So, after showing that there is a separate immaterial substance and how it is a cause, and that it is νοῦς and how it is νοῦς, Aristotle thinks he can now reconstruct a positive account of the good-itself as an ἀρχή, against the failed Platonic accounts of the good-itself as an idea of the good or as the One, and against Speusippus' giving up on the good as an ἀρχή; in so doing he will deliver on a fundamental promise of wisdom from Metaphysics A (see Iα4 above). And indeed Λ10 brings us back to the world of A, to Anaxagoras and Empedocles and Plato and the difficulties of their attempts to describe what the good-itself is, whether it is a formal or efficient or final cause, and whether it has a contrary evil ἀρχή (see Iβ1 above). Since the good-itself is νοῦς, and since νοῦς is a final, and in a special way also an efficient, cause to the heavens (and indirectly to all natural things), Aristotle can exhibit the good-itself as a final cause and thus as a cause qua good, overcoming the objections raised in Metaphysics A against Anaxagoras and Empedocles, who make νοῦς or Love an efficient cause and thus do not use it as a cause qua good, and against Plato, who makes the One a formal cause, and thus again does not use it as a cause qua good. Aristotle is thus also answering the long-deferred aporia B#1, arguing that the ἀρχή is a final and efficient cause but not a formal or material cause, and therefore that wisdom is a science of the final and efficient but not formal or material causes (see Iβ2c above). Also, since the good-itself is νοῦς and since this νοῦς is pure ἐνέργεια, and since contraries always have a common matter which is δυνάμει both, Aristotle infers that the good-itself has no contrary evil ἀρχή, agreeing with Anaxagoras against Empedocles and Plato, and preserving both the promise of A2 that the good will be an ἀρχή and the claim of Θ9 that there is no evil παρὰ τὰ πράγματα. It is of course true generally of Λ that it pulls together results from other Aristotelian places, both in the Metaphysics and in other treatises, to draw consequences for the ἀρχαί, and Λ10 seems to draw especially on Metaphysics N.[1] But the relation to A and B is different: Aristotle is not using their results as premisses for further arguments, but using the results of Λ6-9 (and of Λ1-5, N, etc.) to satisfy their ἴδια of wisdom and to offer solutions to their aporiai--as we will see, not just B#1 but other aporiai as well. David Sedley says that it is "unusual and ... significant that Aristotle's theological inquiry should end, rather than begin, with the critique of his predecessors" (FC p.327), but in fact Λ is the conclusion of the long inquiry into the ἀρχαί which began in AB, and which began, as usual, with an exposition of earlier views and of their difficulties.[2] In introducing the aporiai in B Aristotle had said, among other reasons why "it is necessary to consider all the difficulties beforehand," that otherwise "it is impossible to know if one has found

[1]reference to wherever else I've discussed the relations between Λ and N, including the question of whether they go in the same treatise, and in what order if so (I think Aristotle intended MN as a unit, and intended them to go in the Metaphysics, and intended them to go before Λ, although he may well have taken into MN chunks originally written for something else, and although the process of fitting everything together was not completed). it can be hard to tell whether Λ is looking back to N or just running parallel to it, but I think at least the three senses of not-being in Λ2 must be looking back to N2 (make sure this is in IIIβ1 on Λ2)

[2]same criticism of Sedley IIIβ1 above, but here (next paragraph) I go on to deal with his connected points, where I partly agree

the thing sought for or not" (B1 995a33-4, a36-b1);[3] now, at the end of the road, Aristotle tries to show that he has indeed overcome the difficulties in which the other philosophers are enmeshed.

The function of Λ10 as the culmination of the Metaphysics, bringing closure by connecting back to A and B, thus helps to explain the odd structure of the chapter. Λ10 begins by giving a very brief positive account of the good-itself as an ἀρχή and of its causal influence (1075a11-25). The remaining bulk of the chapter (1075a25-1076a4) is "negative," devoted to pointing out deficiencies in other philosophers' views and especially to raising (or recalling from B) aporiai that these philosophers cannot solve, but that Aristotle can; for much of the text (especially 1075b12-1076a4), Aristotle's style is staccato, firing off one question or complaint after another. The greater part of the chapter thus inevitably reads as an abrupt and disappointing comedown from the heights of contemplation of the good, on which Aristotle has remained all too briefly; and although much of the aporetic discussion continues to be about the good, not all of it is. Bonitz was moved by the apparent incongruity between these two parts of the chapter to propose redividing the text, taking Λ10 1075a11-25 with Λ9 as a continuous discussion "of the nature of the highest principle and its relation to the world" (p.518), and Λ10 1075a25-1076a4 as a separate discussion in which Aristotle uses the errors of the other philosophers as an indirect argument for his own approach (p.520; Bonitz does not say approach to what--apparently to philosophy in general, not specifically to the question of the ἀρχαί).[4] But Λ9 is a tightly self-contained discussion, clearly marked off from Λ10. Λ9's consistent theme is νοῦς, using the assumption that there is nothing better than νοῦς but without investigating the nature of the good or of the ἀρχή. Λ10 begins as a discussion about the good, its status as an ἀρχή, how it causes, and whether it has a contrary evil ἀρχή--topics from A3-7--mentioning νοῦς only in talking about Anaxagoras and about what Aristotle accepts and rejects from him: these are the topics not only of 1075a11-25 but also of 1075a34-b11 and 1075b20-24. And these passages cannot be separated from the rest of the chapter: all of Λ10 (and none of Λ9) is about ἀρχαί, and more specifically, whether it is talking about good and evil ἀρχαί or not, much of the chapter is examining the thesis that there are two contrary ἀρχαί, and that everything else is out-of these ἀρχαί as στοιχεῖα, most plausibly as a formal and a material στοιχεῖον; there is a smooth transition from criticism of the thesis that all things are out-of a contrary matter and form to arguments about good and bad at 1075a34, and a smooth transition back again to general discussion of contraries at 1075b11 (after this the chapter does become more staccato, but there is no special break between discussion of the good and of contraries or ἀρχαί in general).

Much of Λ10 is devoted to the negative thesis that it is not true that all things are out-of two contrary ἀρχαί, especially if these are identified as good and bad, supported by results of Λ1-5 and especially of N4-5: "all these [absurd consequences for the Academics, lovingly detailed in N4 and more quickly summarized in Λ10] arise partly because they make every ἀρχή a στοιχεῖον, partly because they make the contraries ἀρχαί, partly because they make the One an ἀρχή, partly because they make numbers the first οὐσίαι and separate and forms. So if it is impossible either not to posit the good among the ἀρχαί [like Speusippus] or to posit it in this way [i.e., as the One, like Plato], then it is clear that the ἀρχαί and the first οὐσίαι have not been given rightly" (N4-5 1092a5-11). But this negative thesis is in Λ10 closely bound up with a

[3]at 995a36, JAb οὐδέποτε, E Bonitz Ross (and now Laks) οὐδ᾽ εἴ ποτε, Jaeger οὐδὲ πότερον; my translation is neutral between E and Jaeger's emendation (JAb are wrong)

[4]Ross seems to follow Bonitz at least in dividing Λ10 into two unrelated parts, if not in grouping the first part with Λ9. Ross seems generally puzzled by Λ10 and makes no mention of the text in his summary of the Metaphysics (in his preface, and in his Aristotle), except for Λ10 1075a11-25, quoted in passing to help decide whether Aristotle was a "pantheist"--Ross does nothing with the ideas of a good-itself, of the good as an ἀρχή, etc.

positive thesis, drawing on Λ6: that prior to any form and the matter which is potentially the form, or prior to any pair of contraries and the ὑποκείμενον which is potentially each of the contraries, there is an ἀρχή which is not a constituent/στοιχεῖον of the things, but an extrinsic efficient cause of the actual union of the matter with the form or the actual predominance of one contrary over the other at a given time; this ἀρχή must be pure ἐνέργεια and (therefore) have no contrary, or there would be a regress to a further ἀρχή; and this ἀρχή is the source of the world-order and its good. All of Λ10 without exception is devoted to this positive thesis, this negative critique of Plato and Speusippus, and the critique of Anaxagoras and Empedocles on the good (and for Empedocles the evil) as ἀρχαί; as we will see, Aristotle presents this argument as a solution, and an escape from the aporia of earlier philosophers, not only on B#1 but also on #8 and #10. Sedley is right to describe "the bulk of Λ10 [= 1075a25-1076a4]" as an "exercise in negative theology"; as he says, "after a most allusive and elliptical sketch, in [1075a11-25], of the prime mover's causal role from a cosmic perspective, the most that Aristotle is prepared to do in supplying further illumination is to help us see how not to think of that role .... the negativity is Aristotle's best shot at demarcating and clarifying what is distinctive about his own divine first principle. It would be a mistake to imagine that sheer bad luck in the survival of texts has robbed us of some more positive and explicit description of the cosmic role of Aristotle's god" (FC pp.327-8). But Sedley is wrong to think that Aristotle's "negative theology" is anything distinctive to Λ10: most of the Metaphysics, not only the "negative" Z but also most of the "positive" Θ and Λ, has contributed to making clear what the ἀρχή is and how it is a cause to the manifest things only by showing what it is not and how it is not a cause, progressively "purifying" the descriptions that earlier thinkers had given.[5] What is distinctive to Λ10 is that, finally, Aristotle can carry through to completion the project of recognizing the good-itself as an ἀρχή and a first cause, contrasting his proposal with the proposals of Anaxagoras, Empedocles and Plato, and with the despair of Speusippus, above all by his pursuit of the ἀρχή as a cause which is not a στοιχεῖον or a contrary but a pure ἐνέργεια and the cause of actual union to the στοιχεῖα or to the contraries and their ὑποκείμενον.

The positive section

> We must investigate in which way the nature of the universe possesses the good [ἀγαθόν] and the best, whether as something separate and itself-by-itself [κεχωρισμένον τι καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾽ αὑτό], or as [the universe's own] order. Rather, [it possesses the good] in both ways, like an army.[6] For the good [τὸ εὖ: whatever is responsible for the army's being as it should be] is in the order and is also the general, and more the latter: for he is not [good] on account of the order, but the order is [good] on account of him.[7] All things are somehow ordered together

[5]Sedley's description--perhaps quote it in full--is rather close to how I have been describing much of the Metaphysics.

[6]as in Λ9 (see previous section), I am taking ἤ as introducing Aristotle's solution to an aporia, not as asking a question, and I do not keep the question mark

[7]it would be possible to avoid the supplements "[good]" and translate instead "he does not exist on account of the order, but the order exists on account of him." this is how Ross and Sedley take it, and it is certainly true that the general is the cause of the order and not vice versa. however, that would show only that the general is prior to the order in being, not that he is more good (or more the army's good): for this we seem to need that he is the cause, to the order, of its being good; cp. the criteria for being a good-itself laid down at the beginning of EE I,8 (including "cause to the others of their being good"). but in the end the difference doesn't come to much--for the general to be

> [συντέτακται], but not in the same way, even aquatic [animals] and birds and plants, and they are not [arranged] in such a way that one of them has nothing [directed] toward another,[8] rather it does have something. For they are all ordered together toward one [end], but, as in a household[9] the free [family members] have the least license to act at random, but all or most [of their activities] are ordered [τέτακται], whereas the slaves and the beasts have little that is [directed] to the common [end], and much that is at random--nature rules each of them in this way [τοιαύτη γὰρ ἑκάστου ἀρχὴ αὐτῶν ἡ φύσις ἐστίν].[10] I mean, for instance, that all things must at least go to separation [διακριθῆναι: of their constituent elements from one another after death], and there are other things in which all things share that are likewise [directed] to the whole. (Λ10 1075a11-25)

That the world is well ordered, that it does indeed possess "the good and the best," and does so from eternity (it does not need first to sprout or hatch), is supposed to have been established in Λ7. Aristotle now asks about the ontological status of this good which the world has, and he affirms, in deliberately Platonic language, that the good exists "as something separate and itself-by-itself," since the world is well, not simply because it has some quality or because some parts of it bear some relations to other parts, but because it has the ἀρχή which Aristotle has been describing in Λ6-9. For the world to <u>have</u> this ἀρχή as its good is not simply for the ἀρχή to exist and to be good in itself, but for the world to stand in an appropriate causal relationship to the ἀρχή--for the ἀρχή to "order" the world. Aristotle tries to briefly describe this causal influence of

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the cause, to the order, of its being good, is the same as for the general to be the cause of the order, in the sense that he is the cause, to the army, of its being <u>well</u> ordered (and not simply of its being arranged somehow or other)

[8]Aristotle speaks, here and twice below in the paragraph cited, of there being to X (or, of X sharing in) something πρός or εἰς Y; he also speaks of all things being ordered together πρός one thing, and that is presumably the same sense of πρός. I translate "X has something [directed] toward Y"; we might also say that X has an (intrinsic) relation to Y, or (paraphrasing) that X finds its τέλος in Y; another possibility would be "X has something [to contribute] toward Y." Aristotle's question whether the different things in the universe have something πρός each other, or are ordered πρός each other, is close to Theophrastus' question whether there is συναφή τις καὶ οἷον κοινωνία πρὸς ἄλληλα τοῖς τε νοητοῖς καὶ τοῖς τῆς φύσεως, or whether on the contrary the world is ἐπεισοδιῶδες (<u>Metaphysics</u> 4a9-17)

[9]there is a construal problem with this ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκίᾳ. Bonitz thinks it picks up οὐχ ὁμοίως at a16: I <u>think</u> his construal is roughly "all things are somehow ordered together, but not in the same way, even aquatic [animals] and birds and plants (and they are not [arranged] in such a way that one of them has nothing [to contribute] toward another, rather it does have something, for they are all ordered together toward one [end]); rather, [they are ordered together] as in a household, where the free ..."; however, as Ross points out, this seems impossible, since the phrase "for they are all ordered together toward one [end]" has a μέν which would never be answered. Ross, followed by Sedley, says "but it is as in a house, where the free ...". another possibility would be it might also be "[in the ordering of nature], as in a household, the free etc., whereas the slaves and the beasts etc.": in other words, the components of the world-order would not just be <u>compared</u> to free people and slaves, but would themselves metaphorically be <u>called</u> free or slaves. my translation instead takes a19 ὥσπερ ἐν οἰκία to be picked up by a22 τοιαύτη ... ἀρχή: "as in a household the free etc. ... so in nature etc."

[10]with Sedley I reject Jaeger's transposition ἀρχὴ ἑκάστου: see Sedley FC pp.328-9 for discussion. Sedley says that, with the transmitted reading, the nature in question must be collective or cosmic, not simply the nature of each thing. Sedley gives an interesting discussion of the notion of cosmic nature which maybe at work in this passage. I am actually not sure that the transmitted text could not be translated "their nature is such an ἀρχή of each," in which case "their nature" might be just the nature of each one; but in fact I agree that the nature is collective, the τάξις of the universe. in the text above I have chosen to translate differently from Sedley, and less literally (he has "this is the kind of principle that nature is of each of them") to bring out what I think is the force of ἀρχή, connected with the similes of the army and the household

the ἀρχή; much of Theophrastus' Metaphysics, which has close echoes with this passage as with the rest of Λ, will be working through aporiai about this relation between the world and its ἀρχή.

Throughout this passage Aristotle uses the language of "order," τάξις and its cognates. This develops the comparison of the general and the army: the basic meaning of τάττειν is to arrange soldiers in their ranks for battle, τάξις is the order of battle or more concretely a single rank or company, and τακτική is "the science of military movements" (Aeneas Tacticus at Aelian Tactica 3.4).[11] Aristotle varies the army comparison with the simile of the household and the metaphor of the city (implicit at the end of Λ10: τὰ ὄντα οὐ βούλεται πολιτεύεσθαι κακῶς, 1076a3-4, whether πολιτεύεσθαι is passive or middle); but they all involve ruling and commanding and many persons being directed toward a shared purpose, and ἀρχή at 1075a22 probably involves the same implications as well. As we saw in Iα2 above, Metaphysics A2 claims that wisdom, as knowing the good and the for-the-sake-of-which of each thing, "and universally, the best in all nature," is able to rule [ἄρχειν] and to give commands [ἐπιτάττειν]. But, as we also saw, this claim is thoroughly problematic for Aristotle. Although Protrepticus B9 says that only philosophy, "which contemplates the whole good," "contains in itself ... unerring ἐπιτακτικὴ φρόνησις", the mature Aristotle sharply distinguishes theoretical wisdom, which contemplates what is eternally best, from φρόνησις, which assesses the changeable things within our power and gives commands for how to use them: "[φρόνησις] does not use [σοφία], rather it sees how to bring it about; so it issues commands [ἐπιτάττει] for the sake of it, not to it" (EE V,13=NE VI,13 1145a8-9). And the reason that wisdom does not give commands, but rules φρόνησις by being the highest good which it seeks to attain, is that wisdom is knowledge of the divine ἀρχή, which itself does not rule, as a general does, by giving commands: "the god is a ruler [ἄρχων] not by commanding [ἐπιτακτικῶς], but he is that for the sake of which φρόνησις commands [ἐπιτάττει]--we have distinguished elsewhere two senses of 'for the sake of which'--for he is not in need of anything" (EE VIII,3 1249b13-16): that is, as we have seen from Λ7, the divine ἀρχή is for-the-sake-of-which as to-attain-which [τὸ οὗ], not as to-benefit-whom [τὸ ᾧ], since he does not need anything outside him in order to attain his aim, as a general would. So although Λ10 is reaching back to A2 in picking up its language of ruling and commanding, the notion of command and the image of a general commanding his troops are now found to be inadequate.[12] There is still a τάξις, but it must come about by each of the beings striving to "attain" the ἀρχή, by contemplating it, imitating it, or whatever the appropriate relation may be; and perhaps also by some of the beings, lower than the ἀρχή, "commanding" still lower beings, as φρόνησις commands how the arts and other human powers should be used for attaining the good.[13]

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[11]cf. Timaeus 38e6 where the planets "learned what was commanded them [τὸ προσταχθέν]," i.e. how they were to move as part of the joint production of time as an image of eternity; also 36d4-5. (are there parallels in the Laws?)

[12]but perhaps imagine the soldiers imitating the posture, steps, courage etc. of their general; or think of the descriptions of the Persian army (e.g. at Salamis) with the king watching, and everyone trying to excel in the eyes of the king (except that Aristotle's god is not even watching, and cannot reward or punish except by being "attained" to greater or lesser degrees)

[13]if the ἀρχή were giving orders like a general, it would presumably need to have knowledge of the army, so that the soldiers (without their matter), and the distinct commands given to each unit, would have to preexist within the general. Simplicius (In Physica 295,28ff) in fact cites the present passage as his evidence that Aristotle believed in Platonic Forms--i.e. in archetypes of things within the cosmos, preexisting in νοῦς (it is typical of late neo-Platonists that they see the issue between Platonists and Aristotelians about Forms as an issue about God's knowledge, and particularly his providence over the cosmos). but Simplicius is relying, not only on taking the comparison of the general more closely than Aristotle can really be willing to take it, but also on a grammatical misreading: he takes

When Aristotle asks whether the universe is "ordered together," or whether some of its parts have something πρός other parts, he is not asking merely whether there are efficient causal connections, but whether there is teleological ordering. And his claim is that not merely the heavens, but at least to some degree sublunar things, are teleologically directed toward the divine ἀρχή: as we saw in IIIγ1, Aristotle gives some sketch of these teleological relations, not only in ethical texts like Eudemian Ethics VIII,3, but in physical texts like De Anima II,4, describing living things, and De Caelo II,12, describing the different heavenly bodies and sublunar things generally. Not just the heavens and human beings but "even aquatic [animals] and birds and plants" are "somehow ordered together" (note that aquatic animals are the lowest kind of animal according to the end of the Timaeus; they and birds, along with four-footed and more-footed and footless creeping land animals, arise from the reincarnation of particularly foolish human beings, but they all contribute to completing the cosmos and making it a perfect image of its intelligible model, 91d6-92c9).[14]

In the comparison with the household or the city, the free persons are the heavenly bodies, and the "slaves and beasts"--the possessions and tools rather than the constituent members of the city or the household--are sublunar things. It is possible that human beings, or some human beings, count as "free" (as in the Stoic cosmopolis the gods and human sages are free citizens, and fools are slaves), or that some parts of human beings do (as in the Timaeus the rational part of the human soul has a similar status to heavenly souls and bodies); but Aristotle is certainly not going out of his way to say so. Here, as in the passage of De Caelo II,12 discussed in IIIγ1, Aristotle is not describing the roles of humans and other living things within the cosmos, but, rather, making analogical use of standard contrasts between humans and other living things in order to describe the relations between heavenly and sublunar things within the cosmos. De Caelo II,12 says that "the first heaven immediately attains [the most divine ἀρχή] by a single movement, and the things between the first [heaven] and the last things [i.e. the lower heavens, between the first heaven and sublunar things] do reach it, but reach it through many movements" (292b22-5), and Aristotle compares these lower heavens to human beings, who do many things, ordered as means to ends, in order to attain their τέλος (292b1-4); by contrast, "the earth does not move at all, and the things near it with few movements, for they do not reach the goal, but [reach only] as far as they are able to attain the most divine ἀρχή" (292b20-22), and he compares these sublunar things to plants and lower animals, whose actions are simpler than those of human beings, not because they can attain their end without complex efforts, but because they cannot attain the end at all, but only an imitation or substitute for it, and because they do not have many resources to apply toward that end (292b7-10, and cp. through b19). The De Caelo comparison sheds some light on the strangest element of the Λ10 comparison, the idea that the "slaves and beasts" are less ordered to the common end, and less subject to necessity, than the free citizens or family members. From De Caelo II,12, the reason that beasts (and presumably slaves) are not subjected to a strict and complicated regime in order to attain the common τέλος is that they are not capable of attaining that τέλος at all; and presumably it is not so difficult to attain the substitute for the τέλος that they are capable of. Obviously, in Λ10, the slaves and the farm animals will be put to work, but Aristotle still says that they will "have little that is [directed] to the common [end], and much that is at random." This is because they are not properly parts of the city or the

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Aristotle to say, not that the good both is in the order and is the order and is the general, but that the order is also in the general

[14]maybe note Sedley FC p.335 and n14 (crediting Burnyeat) on the concessive character of aquatics/birds/plants, not noticed by Ross

household, so that their virtue would be a constituent of the virtue and thus the happiness of the city or household; they are merely necessary conditions, and for the happiness of the city or household all that is required of them is that they do their jobs, not what the condition of their souls may be or what they do with whatever leisure-time they have. In a well-ordered city (Sparta, or a less warlike version of Sparta), where the legislator frames laws and institutions with a view to making the citizens virtuous, all aspects of the citizens' life will be highly regulated: they may be, for instance, forbidden to engage in trade, and required to take their meals at communal messes with restricted offerings. Since the metics and slaves do not have to be made virtuous and patriotic in this way, and since if they are natural slaves they can no more be made properly virtuous than oxen can, these regulations will not apply to them. And, apparently, this is what the sublunar world is like: sublunar things need not and cannot exhibit perfect order, as the heavenly bodies do, and they cannot come into any direct relation with the divine ἀρχή (except that, presumably, human rational souls can do so, by contemplating it). But they can still play their appropriate parts in the teleological order, by imitating the divine ἀρχή or at least imitating the heavenly bodies, which they do by persisting eternally (through their species) in roughly periodic activity. But much of their life will remain unregulated and unpredictable, and will be determined by the necessity of their material conditions, or simply by chance, and not by final causality. One main task of Theophrastus' Metaphysics, picking up on the sketches of Λ, will be to investigate how far the higher and lower things in the universe form a single order, and how far they can be explained by the causality of the best.[15]

All things out-of contrary ἀρχαί, and how the good is a cause

As we have said, the rest of Λ10 is negative, designed to show the inadequacy of other accounts of the ἀρχαί by bringing out aporiai (some from B) which the other accounts cannot solve, and Aristotle's can. Especially toward the end, the text becomes a staccato series of questions and complaints without developed argument, and the commentators generally report frustration in trying to trace an overall sequence of thought.[16] Still, if we make use of the background in earlier parts of the Metaphysics (including N), I think we can discern at least the main lines of Aristotle's intended argument.

We might expect that, after the positive Λ10 1075a11-25, Aristotle's main concern would be to distinguish his account of the separate good-itself as a final cause from the accounts of the good as ἀρχή that he had criticized in A3-7: those of Anaxagoras and Empedocles, for whom the good seems to serve only as an efficient cause, and of Plato, for whom the good, that is, the One, serves only as a formal cause, and perhaps also as a unit-constituent of the numbers. We might also expect Aristotle to contrast his own account of the good with that of Speusippus, for whom the One is an ἀρχή but the good is not. Aristotle does draw all these contrasts in Λ10 1075a34-b11, but this passage is smoothly embedded in a longer critical discussion of other philosophers' accounts of the ἀρχαί, and Aristotle's first concern after the positive 1075a11-25 is to criticize the doctrine of "everyone," who "make all things out-of contraries" (1075a28). We could explain Aristotle's interest in contraries by saying that his aim is to criticize, not just earlier views on how the good is an ἀρχή, but also on whether it has a contrary evil ἀρχή, and especially the absurd consequence for Plato that all things except the good-itself, even numbers, are made out-

[15] see Sedley in FC pp.332-6 for interesting discussion of the interpretation of Aristotle's claim that all things in the cosmos are "ordered together" toward some one end

[16] note Bonitz and Ross; Sedley's is the best attempt but I don't think his scheme really works

of an evil matter. But actually it is not at all clear that Aristotle's criticism of making all things out-of contrary ἀρχαί is subordinated to his criticism of earlier accounts of good and evil ἀρχαί. Rather, Aristotle thinks it is a fundamental mistake of most earlier philosophers that they "make all things out-of contraries," and he is contrasting this way of thinking about ἀρχαί, not just with what he has said about the good at the beginning of Λ10, but with the account of ἀρχαί that he has been developing in Λ as a whole. He now wants to show that this fundamental mistake makes it impossible to solve a series of aporiai, including the aporia about how the good is a cause (from A3-7 and B#1), but also, as later parts of Λ10 will show, B#8, B#10, and (for at least some earlier philosophers) B#11.

I propose, with Bonitz and Ross, to take Λ10 1075a25-b16 as a unit, and the remaining passage Λ10 1075b16-1076a4 as another, although I think this second unit is both more coherent, and more closely connected with the first, than Bonitz and Ross suppose. The first unit, 1075a25-b16, systematically explores the (absurd) consequences of "making all things out-of contraries"; while the second unit, 1075b16-1076a4, continues to develop this theme, it is more specifically examining a question arising from B#8, namely whether coming-to-be, and especially orderly or continuous coming-to-be, presuppose eternal ἀρχαί, and what kind of eternal ἀρχαί these would be.

Aristotle starts by saying, programmatically, "it should not remain unnoticed how many impossible or absurd [ἄτοπα] consequences follow for those who say otherwise [not just other than Aristotle's account of the good as an ἀρχή in 1075a11-25, but other than his account of the ἀρχαί in Λ as a whole], and what are the accounts of the more refined thinkers [ποῖα οἱ χαριεστέρως λέγοντες, sc. λέγουσι], and what accounts involve the least aporiai" (1075a25-7). This program governs the rest of the chapter, and so indeed does the immediately following summary of what all "who say otherwise" have in common: "everyone makes all things out-of contraries" (a28). The "more refined thinkers" are as usual the Academics, and as usual this compliment sets them up for a fall: the "more refined thinkers" make the same fundamental assumption as their cruder predecessors, and making all things out-of a contrary matter and form does not ultimately resolve the aporiai any better than making them out-of contrary material constituents.

Those who "make all things out-of contraries" are making several assumptions about the ἀρχαί: most obviously that the ἀρχαί are contraries, but also apparently that all things are out-of the <u>same</u> ἀρχαί (confirmed 1075b14: "they make all the things-that-are out-of the same ἀρχαί"--Speusippus will be the exception), and also that the things are made <u>out-of</u> the ἀρχαί as constituents, that is, that the ἀρχαί are στοιχεῖα. Aristotle, of course, rejects all three of these assumptions: as we have seen, Λ4-5 argue that all things are only analogically out-of the same στοιχεῖα, and also that there are ἀρχαί that are not στοιχεῖα, including the ἀρχή in the strict sense, "that which, as first of all things, moves all things" (Λ4 1070b34-5); N1 says emphatically that "none of the contraries is in the strict sense the ἀρχή of all things" (1087b3-4), and Λ10 has insisted that the ἀρχή of all things is the good-itself, which can have no contrary, since we know from Θ9 that there is no evil-itself (again emphatically Λ10 1075b21-2, "there is nothing contrary to the First"). Much of the present argument Λ10 1075a25-b16, that making all things out-of contrary ἀρχαί leads to inextricable difficulties, reads like a compressed summary of things in N, especially N4-5. N4's diagnosis of the source of the opponents' difficulties is, in part, a spelling out of the error of "making all things out-of contraries": "all these [absurd consequences] arise partly because they make every ἀρχή a στοιχεῖον, partly because they make the contraries ἀρχαί, partly because they make the One an ἀρχή, partly because they make

numbers the first οὐσίαι and separate and forms" (1092a5-8, cited above). A difference is that this passage, and Metaphysics N in general, are mainly concerned with Academic theories of the ἀρχαί of intelligible things (understood in mathematical terms), whereas Λ is concerned with ἀρχαί in general, and indeed Λ assumes that we will come to know these ἀρχαί by beginning with sensible things.

However, this difference between N4 and Λ10 is not as great as it may appear. Even in Λ10 Aristotle's main interest is in the Academics, in the difficulties of the Platonic ἀρχαί and in Speusippus' desperate solution: the physicists are brought in mainly as a reminder of the background from which the Academics emerged, with a view to showing that the Academics are in fundamentally the same difficulties. When Aristotle starts by saying "everyone makes all things out-of contraries," this already reminds us of the background in pre-Socratic physics, since it closely echoes the formulation of Physics I,5 ("everyone makes the contraries ἀρχαί", 188a19 and 188a26; "all things must be out-of [the ἀρχαί]" 188a27-8), where all the examples are from the physicists. And Λ10's first criticisms of this thesis echo the criticisms in Physics I: "the contraries cannot be affected [are ἀπαθῆ] by each other; but for us this is solved in a reasonable way by there being a third thing," (Λ10 1075a30-32; the immediate back-reference is to Λ1-2 1069b3-9, concluding "so there is a third thing beside the contraries, the matter"), so that things are not out-of the contraries alone, but out-of the contraries and the common matter; this is close to Physics I,6 189a21-6 ("how does denseness make rareness [into] something, or rareness denseness? ... Love does not gather Strife and make something out-of it, nor Strife out-of Love, but both [act on] some third thing") and 189a34-b3. But Λ10 wastes no time on old-fashioned philosophers who cited only a pair of contrary attributes, like the "hot and cold" (i.e. fire and night) of Parmenides' Doxa (cited at Physics I,5 188a20-22), and failed to mention a common material ἀρχή. The main concern now is with the Academics, who cite a material and a formal ἀρχή, but make the matter contrary to the form--that is, they identify the matter with the privation rather than leaving it neutral between the form and the privation: "some people make one of the contraries [a] matter, like those who [make] the unequal [matter for] the equal, or the many for the one; this too [i.e. the aporia that these people get into, how the matter can receive/be affected by the form, if they are contraries] is resolved in the same way, since for us matter is not contrary to anything" (Λ10 1075a32-4).[17] The Academics, having posited (say) the one-itself or being-itself, as a formal rather than a material ἀρχή, but sharing the physicists' assumption that all things are out-of contrary ἀρχαί, wind up making other things out-of unity and a contrary to unity, or being and a contrary to being. As Aristotle says at the end of our present passage Λ10 1075a25-b16, "some people make the things-that-are out-of not-being, and others, so as not to be compelled to this, make all things one" (1075b14-16). The commentators, following the pseudo-Alexander, take the first group to be pre-philosophical poets or the like, but these would have no point in the present context; and in several passages with close echoes with Λ10, Aristotle describes Plato or other Academics as responding to Parmenides by making the plurality of beings out-of being and something that is not being, or out-of the one and something

[17]two issues (i) this text begins with οἱ δέ 1075a32 (my "some people"), contrastive with ἡμῖν δέ at a31; it is disputed whether this refers to the "everyone" who make all things out-of contraries at a28, and fail to say how at a30, or merely to a subgroup of them; I think it is just a subgroup, namely the Academics (it could be translated either as "some" of the "everyone" or as "others" than "us"); I am agreeing with Sedley FC p.338 and n18; Bonitz and Ross' paraphrase in his commentary are right, Ross' translation is wrong. (ii) with Jaeger, I follow the pseudo-Alexander who reads ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡμῖν οὐδενί ἐναντίον at a34, against the manuscript ἡ γὰρ ὕλη ἡ μία (the difference is only N or A; pseudo-Alexander knows of manuscripts on either side), kept by Bonitz and Ross; but the extant manuscripts might be right

that is not one, at the cost of accepting the resulting absurdities.[18] And that is his point in Λ10 as well: the Academics' ἀρχή, being-itself or the one-itself, is very different from the ἀρχαί of the physicists; but because this too would be an ἀρχή as a στοιχεῖον--namely, as a universal form present in all its participants--everything else would have to be composed out-of this στοιχεῖον and something else that does not already contain this στοιχεῖον: that is, something that is not yet existent and contains no unities, with all the absurdities that follow. For Aristotle himself this difficulty does not arise, in part because he posits matter as a "third thing" not contrary to the form, in part because he does not posit being and unity as genera, and in part because he denies that the ἀρχή in the strict sense is a στοιχεῖον, so that he has no need to make things out-of the ἀρχή and something else.

Λ10 1075a25-b16 raises four difficulties for the thesis that all things are out-of contrary ἀρχαί. At the beginning is the question how contraries can be affected by each other, which we have discussed; at the end is the dilemma between Parmenidean monism and making things out-of not-being, which we have discussed; just before that he recalls B#10, which we will discuss below. But most of the passage, 1075a34-b11, concerns his opponents' difficulties with good and evil, closely echoing N4-5. To begin with, "all things except one [ἅπαντα ... ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός] will participate in the bad: for the evil itself is one of the [two] στοιχεῖα" (1075a34-6). Of course, this consequence will not apply to every philosopher who makes all things out-of a pair of contrary στοιχεῖα, but it will apply to every such philosopher who wants the good to be an ἀρχή, and who must therefore make one of his στοιχεῖα the good, and make the contrary στοιχεῖον the evil; given the shared assumption that all things are out-of a pair of contraries, the only alternative is to deny that the good is an ἀρχή, and this is the other option that Aristotle turns to consider: "the others do not even make the good and evil [to be] ἀρχαί, although in all things the good is most of all an ἀρχή" (1075a36-37). Perhaps this difficulty, or felt difficulty, applies only to the Academics (it does not quite apply to Empedocles, since earth-water-air-fire are a neutral "third thing" and the Sphairos is a compound that excludes Strife, though most compounds will be infected with evil; it would apply to Anaxagoras only under the interpretation of A8 989a30-b21, on which he posits two ἀρχαί, the One [= νοῦς] and the Other [= ὁμοῦ πάντα]). Certainly Aristotle's main concern is with the Academics, and when he speaks of those who deny that the good and evil are ἀρχαί, he is thinking mainly of Speusippus. The more detailed version in N4 spells out why the consequence is especially embarrassing for the Academics: "it follows that everything will participate in the evil except one, the One itself, and that the numbers will participate in it more undilutedly than the magnitudes" (1091b35-1092a1, other nasty consequences lovingly detailed 1091b20-1092a3), and in N4-5 it is obvious that the person who avoid these consequences by denying good and evil in the ἀρχαί is Speusippus (Speusippean labels at 1091b22-5, b32-5, 1092a11-15). Indeed, when Λ10 says that "all things except one" will participate in the bad, we might translate ἅπαντα ... ἔξω τοῦ ἑνός instead as "all things except the One" (so, indeed, most commentators and translators): the N4 parallel, πάντα τὰ ὄντα ... ἔξω ἑνὸς αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἑνός, might be cited in support of either interpretation. But I think that in Λ10 (more than in N4) Aristotle intends his discussion to be as general as possible, bringing out the difficulties of the general way of thinking about the ἀρχαί that the Academics had inherited from the physicists, although undoubtedly the Academics are the main targets.

[18]the passages on Plato or the Academics are N2 1089a2-5, B#11 1001a26-b1 and b19-25, and Physics I,9 191b36-192a8. the basis for the attribution to the poets would be Λ7 1072a19-20 (and cp. Λ6 1071b26-8), but this refers equally to poets and physicists, and "out of not-being" here is a reductio ad absurdum, not something any actual poet or physicist maintained

Thus, having just distinguished philosophers who make their στοιχεῖα the good and the evil from those who do not posit good and evil in the ἀρχαί, Aristotle immediately applies the distinction to physicists as well as Academics: "the others do not even make the good and evil [to be] ἀρχαί, although in all things the good is most of all an ἀρχή; whereas these say, rightly, that [the good] is an ἀρχή, but do not say how the good is an ἀρχή, whether it is as a τέλος or as a mover or as a form" (1075a36-b1). This is clearly taking up A7's critique of Anaxagoras and Empedocles (who seem to use their good ἀρχαί only as efficient causes) and Plato (who seems to use his good ἀρχή only as formal cause); the N4 parallel, for all its stress on the Academics, lists as making the good or the best an ἀρχή, besides "the Magoi" and semi-mythologists like Pherecydes, "some of the later sages such as Empedocles and Anaxagoras, of whom the former made Love a στοιχεῖον and the latter made νοῦς an ἀρχή; and some of those who say that unmoved substances exist say that the one-itself is the good-itself, but they thought its οὐσία was especially the One" (1091b10-15). And indeed in Λ10, to fill in those who "do not say how the good is an ἀρχή" (that is, who do not make it clear that it is a final cause, and so do not clearly make it a cause qua good), he turns immediately to Empedocles and then Anaxagoras, having presumably dealt with Plato already under "those who [make] the unequal [matter for] the equal, or the many for the one." Some of what Aristotle says here against Empedocles and Anaxagoras is just the obvious, namely that they use their good ἀρχαί as efficient rather than final causes (with the implication that they do not use them as causes qua good).[19] But he also makes some slightly more surprising points. For one, he insists that Empedocles' Love functions not only as an efficient cause but also as a material cause, "for it is a part of the mixture" (1075b4); he might have said the same thing about Anaxagoras' νοῦς, but does not, presumably out of deference to Anaxagoras' saying that νοῦς must be unmixed in order to dominate (cited approvingly Physics VII 256b24-7, also DA III,4 429a18-20), and because he wants to present his own ἀρχή as an improved version of Anaxagoras' νοῦς. This difference is presumably also why the N4 parallel (cited above) describes Empedocles' ἀρχή, but not Anaxagoras', as a στοιχεῖον. And I think part of his point is to say that Empedocles and Plato are alike in treating the good and the evil as contrary στοιχεῖα entering into the composition of things: compare the sweeping analogizing of Physics I,5, where earlier philosophers' pairs of contrary στοιχεῖα, "hot and cold, wet and dry, odd and even, Strife and Love," are said to be just more and less abstract formulations of the same antithesis of "container and contained" (188b26-189a9). Empedocles' version will be, if anything, preferable to Plato's, since he also admits the four ordinary elements as a neutral τρίτον τι for Love and Strife to work on and mix with. Nonetheless, Aristotle thinks that Empedocles and Plato are alike enough that similar objections will often apply to both of them. "It is absurd [ἄτοπον] for Strife to be eternal: this is for [Empedocles] the nature of the evil" (1075b6-7), and surely the same absurdity will attend Plato's material ἀρχή; Aristotle does not say here why this is absurd, but presumably it is because of Θ9's argument that evil is always an unnatural (and therefore posterior and non-eternal) result of a δύναμις for good. Likewise, an argument that Aristotle gives further down--"both for those who posit two ἀρχαί there must be another higher ἀρχή; and for those who [posit] the Forms another even higher ἀρχή: for why did [something] come to participate, or why does it participate?" (1075b17-20)--is also intended to

[19]note to earlier treatments, and cite from before against Annas on N4 (who says, among other things, that Aristotle's describing Anaxagoras' and Empedocles' ἀρχαί as the good means that they were final causes). Sedley seems to fall into some of the same confusions, and also to think (in accord with the usual misunderstanding of A) that Aristotle is boasting of having the four-cause scheme which his poor benighted predecessors did not. all of this could be avoided by a careful reading of A7

apply equally to Empedocles and to Plato; I will discuss below how this argument is supposed to work.

Another odd feature of Aristotle's account here of Empedocles and Anaxagoras is his insistence that it is absurd [ἄτοπον], both for Empedocles to posit a (necessarily eternal) contrary ἀρχή to Love, and for Anaxagoras "not to posit a contrary to the good and νοῦς" (1075b10-11). We have seen what seems to lie behind the judgment about Empedocles, but why is it absurd for Anaxagoras to take the position that Aristotle himself thinks is correct?[20] Presumably it is because Anaxagoras lacks some Aristotelian thesis or conceptual clarification that would allow him to successfully defend the true claim that νοῦς has no contrary ἀρχή (to say that his claim is ἄτοπον is not to say that it is impossible, but that it needs defence and explanation).[21] But what exactly is he missing? Aristotle might just be thinking of the reasons he had given in A4 why Empedocles went beyond Anaxagoras in positing an evil ἀρχή as well as a good one: "since the contraries of the goods were also evidently present in nature, not only order and the beautiful but also disorder and the ugly, and there are more evils than goods and base things than beautiful ones, someone else introduced Love and Strife, [making] each of them a cause of one of these [effects]" (984b32-985a4). Then the point would be that Anaxagoras lacks the resources to give Aristotle's alternative explanation for natural evils, namely that they arise, within a framework that is good overall, from the failure of some natural δύναμις, which is per se directed toward a good, to achieve its end; this failure in turn results from the accidental circumstances of matter, where matter is not an evil but simply an imperfect δύναμις for good. If this were the point, then the right thing to say would be neither with Anaxagoras that there is a good ἀρχή with no contrary (and a neutral matter), nor with Empedocles that there is a good ἀρχή with a contrary evil ἀρχή (and a neutral matter), but rather that there is a good ἀρχή and a neutral matter, and that evil is a privation of the good which is not strictly an ἀρχή. However, although this is Aristotle's view about natural form, matter, and privation, it is not his view about the ἀρχαί in the strict sense which are being discussed here: rather, he thinks that the good-itself has no contrary and no privation at all--"there is nothing contrary to the First, for all contraries have [a] matter, and these are δυνάμει" (1075b21-3).[22] So Anaxagoras is right to posit no contrary or privation opposed to νοῦς: the problem is he has no right to this conclusion, because he is committed to νοῦς being essentially δύναμις rather than ἐνέργεια. And this is because "all things were together" and νοῦς was inactive, before it began to act and to produce cosmic order: so the pre-cosmic evil and disorder, as a privation, would be caused (if we regard the matter as neutral and not as a cause of evil) by the privation of νοῦς' activity, so that νοῦς-activity and ἄνοια would be two contrary formal ἀρχαί competing to inhere in a shared ὑποκείμενον, the νοῦς-δύναμις. Of course Anaxagoras does not say this, but he cannot avoid the consequence, unless he admits that νοῦς is essentially ἐνέργεια, and therefore has been producing a good and ordered world from all eternity; "for the others it is necessary that there be something contrary to wisdom and the most honorable knowledge, but for us it is not" (1075b20-21).[23]

There is a similar issue in another criticism that Aristotle gives of Anaxagoras: "Anaxagoras [makes] the good an ἀρχή as mover, for νοῦς moves [i.e. is an efficient cause]; but it moves for the sake of something, and this will be something else, except as we say: for [the art of] medicine

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[20]Bonitz expresses puzzlement; Ross' note is hopeless

[21]note the distinction between ἄτοπον and ἀδύνατον at Λ10 1075aa25-6, N3 1091a12-13

[22]textual note on this passage if I haven't given it before: I read δυνάμει ταῦτα ἔστιν (or ταῦτά ἐστιν) with J Bonitz Ross Jaeger, not EAb δυνάμει ταὐτά ἐστιν.

[23]cp. Sedley FC pp.340-1; he almost comes to the same conclusion, but not quite, and I am not sure why not

is somehow [identical with] health" (1075b8-10). The point may be that since Anaxagoras has failed to cite any further ἀρχή as an end other than νοῦς, and since he does not (and for some reason cannot?) say with Aristotle that νοῦς is identical with its νοητόν or with the end of the motions it produces, he is not citing νοῦς as acting for a good, and so he is not using νοῦς in explanations qua νοῦς, but only as an arbitrary moving power; this would be close to the standard criticisms of Anaxagoras which Aristotle takes over from the Phaedo. Or the point may be simply that, because νοῦς must act for some end (which must be something other than it, "except as we say"), that end rather than νοῦς will be the genuine good ἀρχή, and this ἀρχή Anaxagoras has failed to cite. Perhaps Aristotle does not mean that Anaxagoras cannot identify νοῦς with the end, but only that he does not in fact specify any end, whether νοῦς or something else. However, I suspect that once again the underlying point is that because Anaxagoras' νοῦς is essentially δύναμις rather than simply knowledge-itself, he cannot identify it with its object: the art of medicine is somehow identical with health, but the soul (or human being) that is capable of acquiring that art is not. In any case, Aristotle intends, by saying that the first efficient cause is a νοῦς which is a knowledge of a separate immaterial good, and which is therefore identical with the good it knows, to have solved the first aporia of B in a way that his predecessors could not or did not. B#1 asked whether wisdom can be simultaneously a science of the formal, efficient and final causes, or, if not, which of these sciences best meets the expectations of wisdom laid down in A2; and since wisdom is the science of the ἀρχαί, or of the ἀρχή if there is a single first ἀρχή, wisdom will be a science of some kind of cause if the ἀρχαί are causes of that kind. Of course Aristotle simply agrees with the argument that wisdom, as the most ruling science, must be knowledge of the good and of the final cause (996b10-13). One argument against this was that unmoved things, and in particular mathematical things, do not have final causes (996a21-b1); that argument also suggested that unmoved things cannot be final causes, but Aristole showed how to avoid that implication by the distinction between final causes οὗ and ᾧ at Λ7 1072b1-3, and the rest of the argument need not bother him, since he rejects the Academic assumption that the highest ἀρχαί will be found as causes of mathematicals or of Forms--rather, they will be found as causes of physical things, and mathematicals, being posterior and inseparable from physical things, will offer no independent way to the ἀρχαί. B#1 had argued that, if the science is a knowledge of physical or changeable things, it must be a science of the cause of motion, i.e. the efficient cause (996b22-4), and again, Aristotle simply accepts this. B#1 had objected that wisdom cannot be simultaneously a science of efficient and final causes, since "this [the efficient cause] is different and opposite to the τέλος, so that it would seem to belong to a different science to consider each of these causes" (996b24-6);[24] since B#1 had earlier asked "how would it belong to one science to know the ἀρχαί, if they are not contraries?" (996a20-21), it seems almost to be begging for the solution that because the efficient and final causes are contraries, or more generally opposites, there will be a single science of them both. Instead, Λ10 is saying that "as we say," a single science will know the relevant efficient and final causes, not because they are opposite, but because they are identical.[25]

Wisdom is not, however, a science of the formal cause. B#1 had given an argument that since wisdom is knowledge of what is most knowable, it must be knowledge of the οὐσία, with the implication that it is knowledge of the formal cause, since we most have knowledge of X when we know its τί ἐστι (996b13-22). Λ, from chapter 7 on, takes up the claim that the ἀρχή is the

[24]the reasoning here (not endorsed by Aristotle) seems simply to be that ἀρχή and τέλος, beginning and end, are opposite: the same reasoning is implicit at A3 983a31-2. d make sure all this, including A3, is incorporated in Iβ2c

[25]references back to Iβ2c on B#1, IIIγ2 on the ἀρχή as efficient and final cause, elsewhere? trim duplications

most knowable, and therefore that it is the highest (simple and actual) οὐσία, but it need not be the οὐσία of any given X, since wisdom need not be the science of X, which could be an autonomous science inferior to wisdom. Λ10, in criticizing Anaxagoras, takes care to rescue the possibility that "as we say" the same ἀρχή can be both efficient and final, but in criticizing Plato it never suggests that the same ἀρχή can be both formal and final. Of course, the form of some X can also be its final cause, but such a form will be a στοιχεῖον that enters into composition with the matter of X, it will be opposed to a contrary privation, and it will exist only when the δύναμις of the matter is actualized. Much of the lesson of Λ10 is that we can solve the problem of the ἀρχή only if we recognize that it is not a στοιχεῖον, has no contrary, and is pure ἐνέργεια with no dependence on δύναμις.

The same revisionist conception of the ἀρχή is supposed to be the key to solving B#10: "no one says why some things are corruptible and others are incorruptible: for they make all beings out of the same ἀρχαί" (1075b13-14). This is continuous with all the other objections that Aristotle has been developing to the "everyone" who "make all things out-of contraries" (1075a28): they are making all things out of the same pair of contrary ἀρχαί, in the most important case the One and the indefinite dyad (see A6 988a7-14 for how first the Forms and then the sensibles proceed from these ultimate formal and material στοιχεῖα).[26] The στοιχεῖα themselves will be incorruptible, but why should some combinations of the στοιχεῖα be corruptible and others incorruptible? Aristotle thinks this challenge is unanswerable, and he argues in N2 that no incorruptible thing can be out-of στοιχεῖα at all, because there would necessarily be a δύναμις for the στοιχεῖα to be separated and so for the composite to perish (1088b14-28, some discussion in IIIγ2 above). Aristotle's solution is to give up on looking for eternal ἀρχαί as στοιχεῖα of eternal things (mathematicals or Forms), and also not to look for them as στοιχεῖα of physical things, but rather as ἀρχαί of physical things which do not enter into the composition of the things. The ἀρχαί or ἀρχή in the strict sense are the same for all, while different things proceed from different στοιχεῖα, e.g. a different form and a different matter in each category, as described in Λ4-5. B#10 had raised the difficulty, if corruptible and incorruptible things are not out-of the same ἀρχαί, whether corruptible things are out of corruptible ἀρχαί (in which case there would be a regress to yet prior ἀρχαί) or out of incorruptible ἀρχαί (in which case why should these incorruptible ἀρχαί yield corruptible things, while other incorruptible ἀρχαί yield incorruptible things? all these difficulties 1000b23-32). Aristotle can answer that corruptible things depend on an incorruptible ἀρχή as an extrinsic efficient cause, but that they are corruptible because of the matter and form that they are out-of as constituent στοιχεῖα; since (as Λ3 argued, drawing on Z8) this matter and this form are not properly generable and corruptible, there is no regress to further στοιχεῖα, out-of which they would come-to-be, but they are also not properly incorruptible ἀρχαί: the individual form because it is and is-not simultaneously with the composite (Λ3 1070a21-4), the universal form because it is inseparable and dependent on the individuals (Λ5 1071a19-29), and the matter because it is a pure δύναμις inseparable and dependent on the actual composites.[27]

The need for an ἀρχή of coming-to-be and the insufficiency of material and formal ἀρχαί

[26]Sedley FC pp.341-2 thinks, oddly, that the question is mainly about the incorruptibility of the heavens. note also B#10 1000b32-1001a1 "no one has even tried [positing] different [ἀρχαί for corruptible and incorruptible things], rather they say that the ἀρχαί of all things are the same"

[27]this is repeating/summarizing a previous discussion, give ref

The remaining lines of Metaphysics Λ, Λ10 1075b16-1076a4, continue the preceding criticisms of theories, especially Academic theories, that make all things out-of a pair of contrary ἀρχαί. These last lines can seem scattershot, a series of brief disconnected complaints; and certainly the text is missing the explanations and the transitions between topics that a fuller version would have had. Nonetheless, there is a unifying theme that connects at least most of the things Aristotle says here. He is taking up the Platonist argument of B#8, that coming-to-be is impossible unless there is first some eternal ἀρχή, itself immune to coming-to-be. Aristotle argues that while this argument is correct, the eternal thing that it establishes beyond the sensibles is not a formal or material στοιχεῖον but an ἐνέργεια without δύναμις that is the cause of the union of form and matter; and he argues that there are many things, including coming-to-be and especially ordered coming-to-be, that the Academics (and others) cannot explain if they posit only formal and material ἀρχαί, or if they posit only contrary ἀρχαί, or more generally if they posit only ἀρχαί that involve δύναμις (as formal and material causes must, and as contraries also must). The repeated complaint "nobody says why ..." (above 1075b13 on B#10, now 1075b16-17 on coming-to-be, and then 1075b34-6 on the unity of form and matter) is both raising an aporia and pointing to the need for a different kind of cause and ἀρχή.

Aristotle starts by complaining, "why there will always be coming-to-be, and what is the cause of coming-to-be, no one says" (1075b16-17). The inexhaustibility of coming-to-be is a fundamental datum which different philosophers try to explain in different ways (e.g. by positing an ἄπειρον reservoir from which things come-to-be),[28] but Aristotle argues in the On Generation and Corruption that all prior attempts at explanation are insufficient, and that we must posit as an efficient cause of inexhaustible coming-to-be the eternally continuous motions of the heavens; Physics VIII,6 and Metaphysics Λ6 also make this argument, in their different ways, and argue further that the motions of the heavens must come from eternal constantly acting movers. Here at the end of Λ10 Aristotle is in part using Plato's account of νοῦς in the Philebus and Timaeus against Plato's account of the One and the Dyad as sufficient ἀρχαί; but Aristotle also goes further, to criticize Plato's and Anaxagoras' accounts of νοῦς, and also accounts like those of Empedocles and the Statesman, which posit two contrary moving causes. In presenting Aristotle's thought here, I will somewhat reorder the sequence of topics in 1075b16-1076a4, so as to separate the different logical strands in Aristotle's argument.

Aristotle says, "why there will always be coming-to-be, and what is the cause of coming-to-be, no one says. Both for those who posit two ἀρχαί there must be another higher [κυριωτέρα] ἀρχή; and for those who [posit] the Forms another even higher ἀρχή: for why did [something] come to participate, or why does it participate?" (1075b16-20).[29] While this will have

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[28]also Physics III,4 203b18-20 lists this as one of the usual reasons for positing an ἄπειρον. Sedley FC p.342 misses Aristotle's point: "No one previously has found the cause which explains the permanence of generation. [para break] Aristotle takes all his predecessors, even Plato, to believe that our world had a temporal beginning. Hence, trivially, none of them accounted causally for the permanence of generation, since none of them believed that generation is eternal." But those who think our world has a beginning and an end (Anaximander, Empedocles, Democritus, the Statesman) typically believe in an endless series of worlds arising, and thus in the inexhaustibility of generation; and in one sense Aristotle's formula ἀεὶ ἔσται γένεσις holds even for Anaxagoras and the Timaeus, who think the world has a beginning but no end.

[29](1) reading καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη ἔτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ κυριωτέρα, conjectured by Bonitz and adopted by Ross (the manuscripts have ὅτι instead of ἔτι), and taking καί ... καί as "both ... and". if we keep ὅτι with Bonitz' printed text and Jaeger, or read ἔσται (another conjecture of Bonitz), then we will just have a statement about the people who posit Forms, parallel to but separate from the earlier point against the dualists, and it is hard to see why Aristotle would repeat himself in this way; Christ solves the problem by reading just καὶ τοῖς τὰ εἴδη, taking ὅτι ἄλλη ἀρχὴ

implications against Empedocles and the Statesman, let us start by taking the argument in the most obvious way, as directed against those who posit a formal and a material ἀρχή. Aristotle is then saying that those who posit a formal and a material ἀρχή, whether the One and the Dyad, or Forms and the Receptacle, must also posit a third ἀρχή to explain why the matter participates in the form: this is the argument made notably at GC II,9, and is entirely in agreement with the Philebus and Timaeus on the need to posit νοῦς or the demiurge as a cause of the imposition of limit on the unlimited. Aristotle, like Plato, describes the cause of coming-to-be equally as the cause of the union of matter and form: so here "why does it participate?", and, further down, "why the numbers are [each, as a whole] one, or soul and body, or generally the form and the object, no one says anything--nor is it possible to say, except as we say, that the mover makes [i.e. unites the matter and form, by actualizing the potentiality of the matter]" (1075b34-7--"as we say" refers back to H6, and cp. H3).[30] But for Aristotle, as for Plato, what needs to be explained is not simply coming-to-be or the participation of matter in form, but ordered coming-to-be and ordered participation: thus for the Plato of the Timaeus, there are randomly appearing images of the Forms even in the chaotic Receptacle, but the demiurgic νοῦς must intervene to ensure that different parts of the Receptacle participate in the Forms according to an overall orderly pattern. So too Aristotle says here, "if there are not other things beside [παρά] the sensibles, there will not be an ἀρχή and order [τάξις] and coming-to-be and the heavenly [bodies], but every ἀρχή will have a [prior] ἀρχή, as for all the theologians [= mythologists] and physicists" (1075b24-7).[31]

It is not immediately obvious from this text why a regress of ἀρχαί would follow. But a parallel in the Metaphysics K version of B#8--"almost [all] the most refined [thinkers] seek on the assumption that there is such an ἀρχή and οὐσία [sc. eternal, separate and καθ᾽ αὐτήν]: for how will there be order [τάξις] if there is nothing eternal and separate and abiding?" (K2 1060a24-7)--suggests that Aristotle intends the argument to begin from the Platonist side of B#8. B#8 had asked whether "there is something beside [παρά] the individuals" (999a26); the Platonist side argues that if there is nothing beyond individual (sensible) things, then there will be nothing eternal, and that "if there is nothing eternal, coming-to-be will also not be possible" (999b5-6), because every coming-to-be presupposes a material and a formal ἀρχή, and if these are not eternal there will be an infinite regress to prior ἀρχαί (999b6-14).[32] (The same line of thought is further developed at B#10 1000b24-9, and its parallel K2 1060a24-7, to argue that the ἀρχαί of corruptible things must be incorruptible.) So here at Λ10 1075b24-7 one argument

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κυριωτέρα as a gloss. with ἔτι there is a bit more of a point to the second statement: for those who posit (not just two ἀρχαί at the same level, but) Forms, there must be a yet higher ἀρχή. "higher" is not quite right for κυριωτέρα: the implication is "more determining," since it determines whether something comes out-of the formal and material ἀρχαί or not. but no great issue is at stake; (2) the implied subject of "participate" might be neuter plural, the sensible things (or the parts of the receptacle) that come to participate in the Forms; (3) reading at the end μετέσχεν ἢ μετέχει Ab Bonitz Ross Jaeger, but the reading of EJ μετέσχεν ἢ μετίσχει might be defensible, taking the rare "μετίσχει" to mean "continue to participate." but it is also possible that μετίσχει is a mistake by a scribe trying to write the "present" of μετέσχεν, not recognizing μετέσχεν as the aorist of μετέχει.

[30]note on the K2 1060b10-11 parallel on numbers, here or below. on the problem why each number is one see also M7 1082a15-26 and texts toward the end of M8

[31]at 1075b24 Jaeger's ἔτι εἰ (following the Translatio Anonyma and William and some manuscripts of pseudo-Alexander's lemma) is certainly better than codices Bonitz εἴτε, probably better than Christ Ross εἴ τε, but nothing much hangs on it. Ross' suggestion that τὰ οὐράνια are celestial motions rather than celestial bodies is attractive

[32]crossref to acct of B#8 in Iβ3. I may now see more clearly than before the parallel between εἶναι at 999b6 and forms of εἶναι at 999b13-14 {the matter or form, "exist," sc. prior to the composite, and to avoid an infinite regress the ultimate matter or form must be ingenerable}; go back and check that your accounts harmonize

would be that if, like the theologians and the physicists, we posit material ἀρχαί that are sensible and similar to the things they are posited to explain, then we will need further material ἀρχαί to explain those ἀρχαί (as in Epicurus' question "and Chaos whence?"). Now we know that Aristotle does not think this argument really succeeds in showing that there is an separate eternal material ἀρχή, or an eternal separately formal ἀρχή either. It is still sufficient to refute the view that there are only corruptible ἀρχαί. It is not in itself sufficient to refute the view that there are no ἀρχαί, but only horses generated by horses and so back ad infinitum, with no separate eternal things to guide the process; but Aristotle can fill out the argument by arguing, as he does in Physics VIII,6 (discussed in IIIβ2a above), that in this case there would be no sufficient explanation for the τάξις of the process and thus of the perpetuity of coming-to-be. Aristotle does not worry about this here, because his current targets are the Platonists. He agrees with the Platonist claim in B#8 that there would be no τάξις or coming-to-be if there were no eternal ἀρχή beyond the sensibles (even if he thinks the Platonist argument in B#8 would need filling in), and he also agrees that an eternal material ἀρχή would not be sufficient. But, he argues, an eternal formal ἀρχή would also be insufficient, for what would be the cause of motion and participation? Aristotle's strategy is to show that Platonism (at least the kind of Platonism that posits only the Forms and the Receptacle or the One and the Dyad as ἀρχαί) is not sufficient to meet the Platonist's own challenge against the theologians and the physicists, and thus to show that none of Aristotle's predecessors are able to solve B#8. The argument is close to what we have seen in Λ6--"so there is no benefit [for explaining motion] even if we posit eternal οὐσίαι, like those who posit the Forms, if there is not in them some ἀρχή capable of causing change" (1071b14-16)--and Aristotle is doubtless referring back to that argument. Indeed, Aristotle immediately goes on to say, "if the Forms or numbers exist, they will not be causes of anything, or, if they are, anyway not of motion" (Λ10 1075b27-8). However, a Platonist will reply that νοῦς is the cause of participation and of motion or coming-to-be. Aristotle has several replies available. One is that the One and the Dyad are the only ultimate ἀρχαί of all things, so that everything else, including νοῦς, must somehow arise from a participation of the Dyad in the One; so while νοῦς might be the cause of matter participating in the Forms to produce sensible things, there will be prior instances of participation which νοῦς cannot explain, and which nothing else will be able to explain either. As we have seen, Aristotle in complaining about the lack of an explanation of participation says that no one says "why the numbers are [each, as a whole] one," and that indeed this cannot be explained "except as we say, that the mover makes [i.e. combines the units into wholes, or more generally imposes form on the matter by actualizing the potentiality of the matter]" (1075b34, b36-7); and if the numbers are separate eternal things with no movers and no potentialities, this kind of explanation cannot apply to them. But even setting aside the problem of the structure of the intelligible world, Aristotle has another argument that νοῦς is not sufficient to explain coming-to-be, if νοῦς is as Plato describes it in the Timaeus.

Aristotle has said, "why there will always be coming-to-be, and what is the cause of coming-to-be, no one says. Both for those who posit two ἀρχαί [sc. and for those who posit the Forms] there must be another higher [κυριωτέρα] ἀρχή" (1075b16-18). "Those who posit two ἀρχαί" would include not only those who posit a material and a formal ἀρχή, but also those who posit two contrary efficient ἀρχαί, like Empedocles and the Statesman--and since Aristotle has been discussing Empedocles on contrary good and evil ἀρχαί earlier in the chapter, he can hardly have forgotten him now.[33] The reason that (for instance) Empedocles would need to posit a

[33]against Ross, who thinks that Aristotle is arguing only against matter-form theories, and arguing that we must also posit an efficient cause

higher ἀρχή is the reason given at Physics VIII,1 252a19-b5 (discussed IIIβ2a above): not to explain the combination of Love and Strife (since they do not combine), but to explain their alternation in activity, and especially the regularity of their alternation in activity; this further ἀρχή would be κυριωτέρα in the sense that it would control the activity of the contrary ἀρχαί, e.g. by causing Strife to move alternately closer to and further away from the cosmos. As Aristotle says here, "none of the contraries can be essentially active and moving [ὅπερ καὶ ποιητικὸν καὶ κινητικόν]: for it would be possible for it not to be. But acting [ποιεῖν] is posterior to δύναμις; so the things-that-are are not eternal. But they are. So one of these [premisses] must be denied; and it has been said how" (Λ10 1075b30-34). This is mostly recapitulating the argument of Λ6 1071b16-20, and ultimately of B#14 1003a2-5, that ἀρχαί whose essence is δύναμις are not sufficient to explain eternal motion or an eternal world. Aristotle is now putting this together with Λ10's earlier discussion of contraries: "all contraries have [a] matter, and these are δυνάμει" (1075b22-3), since two things are contraries only inasmuch as they compete to occupy a common ὑποκείμενον which is δυνάμει each of them.[34] So Aristotle concludes that ἀρχαί which are contraries are not sufficient to explain an eternal world, and therefore that there must be some ἀρχή which is not a contrary. Implicitly, he is concluding something stronger, that there are no contrary ἀρχαί, since, if there were, the κυριωτέρα ἀρχή responsible for actualizing them would be prior to them, and so they would not really be ἀρχαί. The argument against those who posit two contrary efficient ἀρχαί is similar to the argument against those who posit two contrary στοιχεῖα as ἀρχαί: whether we make the contraries combine immediately with each other, or make them compete with each other to combine with a ὑποκείμενον, we will need a higher cause of actualization, and we can block an infinite regress only by positing a cause which is essentially ἐνέργεια without δύναμις, and which therefore can neither be a στοιχεῖον nor have a contrary.

Aristotle apparently intends the argument against contrary efficient ἀρχαί to work not only against Empedocles and the Statesman, but also against Anaxagoras and the Timaeus, who posit a single efficient ἀρχή which is inactive during the period of pre-cosmic disorder and active during the period of cosmic order. As we have seen, Λ10 says that it was ἄτοπον for Anaxagoras not to posit a contrary to νοῦς, apparently because he is logically committed to regarding the νοῦς which persists from the period of disorder to that of order as a ὑποκείμενον (something like a soul) which is in potentiality equally to νοῦς in the strict sense and to ἄνοια: this νοῦς in the strict sense and its contrary ἄνοια would be the ultimate efficient ἀρχαί, and would be subject to the same criticisms as Empedocles' Love and Strife. The same argument would apply to the Timaeus, and indeed Plato in the Laws speaks of the souls that move the world-bodies as being conjoined with νοῦς or ἄνοια, wisdom or folly (Laws X 897b1-4). As Aristotle says here, aiming surely at Anaxagoras and Plato among others, "for the others it is necessary that there be something contrary to wisdom and the most honorable knowledge, but for us it is not; for there is nothing contrary to the First, for all contraries have [a] matter, and these are δυνάμει; and the contrary ignorance is [contrary] to a contrary [ἡ δὲ ἐναντία ἄγνοια εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον], and there

[34]objection: Empedocles does not seem to think of Love and Strife as sharing a ὑποκείμενον, or as having ὑποκείμενα: they seem to be just contrary substances. answer: Aristotle thinks that substances cannot be contraries. to the extent that it makes sense to think of Love and Strife as being contraries, this is because they are competing to be present in, or to be acting upon, earth-water-air-fire. Love and Strife might be eternal substances, and in no potentiality to passing-away, but they would still be in potentiality to acting or not acting on earth-water-air-fire, and because neither of them is essentially acting on bodies, neither of them is sufficient to explain an eternal effect; nor are both together, but only the regular alternation of the two of them in acting on earth-water-air-fire, and without an essentially active ἀρχή there is no explanation for this regular alternation

is nothing contrary to the First" (Λ10 1075b20-24). Here there is both textual and a larger interpretive problem. All the manuscripts and all major modern editions (Bonitz, Ross, Jaeger) say that the contrary ignorance would be εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον, but the expression is difficult and the editors express dissatisfaction with it; Ross and Jaeger suggest ἐστὶν (or ἔσται) ἐναντίου (or τοῦ ἐναντίου), Sedley εἰσ<άγει> (or εἰσ<φέρει>) τὸ ἐναντίον, and something like this may be right. But the more serious question is what the relation would be between the contrary ignorance and the contrary that it would be to or of or would introduce; and this question is connected with the way we read Aristotle's argument-strategy. Ross, following the pseudo-Alexander, takes Aristotle to be arguing: everyone else, since they admit that the ἀρχή has a contrary, must also admit the absurd conclusion that there is also a ἕξις contrary to (human) wisdom, since wisdom is the knowledge of the ἀρχή, and what is contrary to the ἀρχή will therefore be the object of a ἕξις contrary to wisdom, namely the contrary ignorance. But for two reasons it seems clear that this cannot be what Aristotle is doing. First, the conclusion that there is something contrary to human wisdom does not seem absurd (certainly it is no more manifestly absurd than the initial assumption that there is something contrary to the ἀρχή); second, pseudo-Alexander and Ross assume that the contrary of an object of knowledge would be an object of ignorance, whereas Aristotle's view is in fact that the contrary of an object of knowledge is the object of that same knowledge, since a single ἕξις of knowledge is the knowledge of both contraries at once. And in context in Λ10 Aristotle has no reason to bring in human beings and their ἕξεις at all. "Wisdom and the most honorable knowledge" is simply a way of naming the ἀρχή, if, as Aristotle agrees with Anaxagoras and Plato, the first efficient ἀρχή is νοῦς; and there can be no contrary to the ἀρχή ("to the First"), since a contrary is always contrary to a contrary, and the ἀρχή cannot be a contrary, since then it would be δυνάμει. Aristotle's reason for saying "wisdom and the most honorable knowledge" here rather than simply "νοῦς" may be to underline that if the persisting νοῦς is a ὑποκείμενον that passes from inactivity to activity, and so (Aristotle suggests) from ignorance to wisdom, the real efficient ἀρχή would not be the persisting νοῦς but the wisdom it comes to participate in; and even if Anaxagoras and Plato do not posit a contrary to the persisting νοῦς, they are forced to posit an ignorance contrary to the higher wisdom, and so they ultimately fall into the same difficulties as Empedocles.[35]

Alternatives to Plato: Speusippus and Aristotle

Λ10 began with the question of the τάξις of the universe (the "nature of the whole" 1075a11, compared to an army a13-15 and to a household a18-23), and of whether and how this τάξις depends on an ἀρχή that is a separately existing good. Aristotle of course wants to maintain that there is such a separate good and that it is the cause of the order of the universe, but he also wants to point out the difficulties, and especially difficulties in describing the good and its causality, that arise for different accounts of the ἀρχαί. In particular, we have seen the difficulties if the good is one of two contrary στοιχεῖα, or if it is one of two contrary efficient ἀρχαί, either with an explicit contrary as in Empedocles or with an implicit contrary as in Anaxagoras. For Aristotle, all this is designed to lead us up to his own positive account, which he presents as the only satisfactory solution to B#8, as well as to B#1. To account for order in the realm of coming-to-be, we must posit incorruptible (and, ultimately, unchangeable and non-sensible) ἀρχαί of corruptible things: thus far Aristotle is with the Platonist side of B#8. But then Aristotle argues that it is insufficient if these ἀρχαί are στοιχεῖα, whether the physicists' kind of

[35]compare and contrast Sedley FC pp.340-41, who at least sees that Aristotle is talking about the divine νοῦς.

στοιχεῖα or "intelligible" στοιχεῖα like the One and the Dyad. Such causes would be unable to explain motion or coming-to-be, and they would be unable to explain the existence of corruptible things at all (Aristotle thus invokes both sides of B#10: neither corruptible nor incorrptible στοιχεῖα can explain the existence of corruptible things). Indeed, the One and the Dyad would be unable to explain even the existence of magnitudes, which are supposed to occur already in the realm of unchanging and incorruptible things: "if the Forms or numbers exist, they will not be causes of anything, or, if they are, anyway not of motion. Further, how, out-of what is without magnitude, will there be magnitude and the continuous? For number will not produce a continuum, either as mover or as form" (1075b27-30)--Academics had tried to show how the two, the three and the four could be the formal causes of line, surface and solid respectively, but Aristotle dismisses all this as hopeless, and there are of course no moving causes of unchangeable mathematical things, as was pointed out at B#1 996a21-b1.[36] Aristotle's alternative to all these difficulties is to give up on positing intelligible ἀρχαί as στοιχεῖα, and also to give up on positing them as causes of mathematical things, but rather to posit them as moving causes of physical things; so the first ἀρχή will be like the νοῦς of the Timaeus, except an independent ἀρχή and not depending on Forms or numbers, and with no explicit or implicit contrary, eternally and essentially active and so producing an eternal ordered physical world. However, Aristotle's is not the only alternative to the difficulties of the Platonic theory of ἀρχαί. We could agree with Aristotle in giving up on intelligible formal (or material) ἀρχαί of physical things, while thinking that moving causes of physical things will not get us above the realm of physics. Even if Aristotle's solution can explain how partless unchanging ἀρχαί can give rise to change and to a realm of changing things, it will not be able to explain how they give rise to unchanging mathematical things, except by redescribing these mathematical things as somehow parasitic on changing physical things--which for most Academics would be too high a price to pay.

The lesson Speusippus draws is not to give up on ἀρχαί as στοιχεῖα (in contrary pairs), or to give up on ἀρχαί of mathematical things, but to give up on causal explanations that cross the boundary between one realm of beings and another, numbers or geometricals or souls or celestial or sublunar things. "Those who say that mathematical number is first, and in this way [posit] at each stage another subsequent οὐσία and different ἀρχαί for each, make the οὐσία of the all episodic (for each [οὐσία] contributes nothing [more] to another [οὐσία] by existing than if it did not exist), and make many ἀρχαί: but the beings are unwilling to be governed [πολιτεύεσθαι] badly. 'Having many commanders is not good: let there be one commander'" (1075b37-1076a4).[37] In comparing the totality of beings to a city which can πολιτεύεσθαι well or badly, or to the Achaean army which should obey a single commander rather than each deciding independently whether to go home, Aristotle is picking up the talk of τάξις and the army and household comparisons from the beginning of Λ10. (Also, as Sedley points out, "τὴν τοῦ παντὸς οὐσίαν" here recalls "ἡ τοῦ ὅλου φύσις" in the first line of Λ10, and I would add also "εἰ ὡς ὅλον τι τὸ πᾶν" in the second line of Λ1.) Speusippus had never said that having

[36]Secdley FC pp.343-4 seems to misunderstand this passage as being all about unextended things being unable to cause motion; of course (as Sedley notes) Aristotle himself thinks that (his preferred) unextended things can cause motion, and his main point here is about causing Platonist intermediate geometricals. also: cite here, if not even in the main text, B#11 1001b17-25, which Aristotle is certainly referring to here, and saying that it cannot be resolved on Platonist grounds (though it could be by Speusippus)

[37]the quote is Iliad II,204; in the good manuscripts of Aristotle the final ἔστω is missing, but is added by a second hand in E (it is printed by Ross but not Bonitz or Jaeger); but I cannot imagine why Aristotle would have left it out. describe some of the context? it is not clear whether πολιτεύεσθαι is passive or middle. also note, here is not elsewhere, on the implications of "episodic," and perhaps give the example of the Prometheus Bound.

many commanders was good; it is simply how things are. The many realms of being do not constitute a single city, and whether they are willing or unwilling to be ruled in this way does not change how they are ruled. There is no single good that explains the order or disorder of the totality of beings. The One is not the good, because if it were, multiplicity would be the evil, and there would be evil in each of the numbers; in any case, there are no final causes of mathematical things, and it is pointless to look for goodness in their ἀρχαί. Any goodness that may arise, presumably first on the level of souls, is an after-product and not explanatory of the structure of the totality of beings.

Much of the Metaphysics has been directed toward the proving the thesis of Λ10, that it is possible to avoid Speusippus' conclusions. Aristotle and Speusippus have seen many of the same difficulties in the Platonic program, but they have made very different choices about what to abandon and what to save. As we have seen (in Iα4 and Iβ1 above) from Metaphysics A on, Aristotle has set out to save the Platonic program, or more broadly the Anaxagorean-Empedoclean-Platonic program, of explaining the world through the good as an ἀρχή. He has shown the difficulties of the previous attempts at executing this program, and now, in Λ10, he claims to have shown how to resolve them. He can deliver a separate good-itself without a contrary evil ἀρχή, causing by being good and explaining the order of the universe; he can also deliver, as promised in Γ1 (also against Speusippus) a highest ἀρχή which is directly or indirectly a cause of being (interpreted as ἐνέργεια) to all the things that are, and in this way too is an heir to Plato's Idea of the Good and to his One-itself. The main price, from the Platonist point of view, is that he ascribes to it a kind of causality that means it cannot be a cause to mathematical things, but Aristotle is quite willing to sacrifice the mathematical and Pythagorean side of Platonism. Λ10, by its allusions to Metaphysics A and to the aporiai of B (B#1, #8, #10, also the end of #11 on the transition from numbers to magnitudes) which Aristotle claims that he can solve and that the other accounts cannot, presents itself as the desired conclusion of the Metaphysics, showing (as a conclusion should, Rhetoric III,19) that the author has done what he set out to. Neither the negative strategy of the greater part of Λ10 1075a25-1076a4, nor the concluding focus on Speusippus in particular, should be seen as disappointing; both serve to bring out the magnitude of what Aristotle claims to have done.